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‘What shall be our new ornaments?’ Description’s Orientations 
 
On 12th June 2014, the poet Jonty Tiplady posted the following note on-line: 
Ever since I was a boy I was searching for a better description […] Coming up 
with a better description is [something]. I need to come up with a better 
description. But each time it starts again. Each time we obsess again to 
understand what it was better, to describe the breakdown of the previous 
description […] What would it mean to recover from the compulsion to 
describe like an addict comes off a drug? [...] Each time I live a life without 
description, I want to go back to a better description, back to the factory of the 
description.1 
Description as addiction? Would we admit such a condition and acknowledge a 
general state of dependency? The confession is suggestive, not only in being a 
performative re-description of a speech act conventionally understood as constative, 
but also in its turning of the regulatory aspects of the age-old discourse of description, 
those repressive injunctions that have sought to control and restrict a register of 
composition believed to be prone to indulgence and excess in its formal operations -- 
parataxis; amplification; enargia -- and so constitutionally at risk of betraying an 
ostensibly utilitarian function.2 Tiplady is also tendentiously framing those diagnostic 
forms of thinking and writing more usually understood as anti-descriptive, or rather, 
as understood to have overcome description in the interests of attaining the higher 
ground of interpretation and critique. As such, the confession carries more than 
personal resonance, because it is this implied hierarchy, articulated variously over the 
centuries and according to which description is and should remain a lesser or 
secondary register, that has been subject recently to a sustained re-evaluation the 
avowed aspiration of which -- ‘Building a Better Description’ -- is unequivocally a 
call to return to the factory and keep faith with description’s promises, however 
dependant or symptomatic the commitment.3 
The re-purposing of description as a mode peculiarly appropriate to the times began in 
earnest in 2009, in a special issue of Representations devoted to ‘The Way We Read 
Now’. The context as established is already relatively familiar, and perhaps of only 
parochial interest, but it bears repeating as counterpoint to Tiplady’s provocation and 
as frame for what follows here. Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, editors of the 2009 
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volume, acknowledge its origins in a 2006 event intended to mark the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the publication of Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious, ‘the 
book that popularized symptomatic reading among U.S. literary critics’.4 While not 
intending a sustained argument against the hermeneutics of suspicion, Best and 
Marcus identify signs of a generational shift in the humanities, away from 
symptomatic reading as method and, more generally, as orientation, and towards 
forms of what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, in the defining essay of this generational 
shift, calls ‘reparative reading’.5 Symptomatic reading is polemically interpretative 
and strategically paranoid, concerned with the meaning that matters as being ‘hidden, 
repressed, deep’. ‘Surface reading’, conversely, operates in its various guises 
according to an alternative metaphorics, one of susceptibility, immersion, literalism, 
forgetfulness, weaknesses, and above all, surfaces and proximity. And so arrives 
description: ‘Attention to surface as a practice of critical description […] We want to 
ask what it might mean to stay close to our objects of study, without citing as our 
reason for doing so a belief that those objects encapsulate freedom. We pose this 
question, in part, out of a sense of political realism about the revolutionary capacities 
of both texts and critics’.6 
Come 2016 and description has emerged as perhaps the emblematic term for the kinds 
of writing imagined and advocated in the ‘post-hermeneutical’ environment7 -- not 
least, so the editors acknowledge, because ‘description is everywhere, a ubiquitous 
and necessary condition of scholarship’.8 Description as invoked here is far from 
being new or radically reconceived; indeed, to imagine as much would be to enact yet 
one more cycle of heroically sceptical overturning, albeit the performative 
contradiction is impossible entirely to avoid when scepticism has provoked the 
identification of something other than itself. It is instead a matter of reclamation and 
transvaluing, and in being so, in keeping with a historical discourse attendant on 
description that is characterised by opposing valuations of a relatively stable set of 
constituent parts. Several of these parts are evident in the ‘better’ description 
proposed by the editors: the literalism and tautology that are acknowledged and re-
valued rather than rejected as impossible or quietistic; the scripting or writtenness of 
description, according to which the mode is unashamedly and actively an effect of 
style and so of the creative potentiality of writing; the constitutional pull of 
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description towards detail and contingent particularity, the eco-critical and queer 
phenomenological possibilities of which are readily apparent; and so forth. 
The avowed intention is thus re-descriptive, with the risk involved being that of 
repeating description’s constitutional tendency, so the story goes, to get precisely 
nowhere; its tendency, that is, to stop the clock so as to allow the potentially 
redundant and obstructive accumulation of accidentals. The editors, along with the 
most inventive of the practitioners, work conceptually from within the conventions to 
hand, turning them around and about. It is to this project, concerned with the 
inhabitation of description’s own register, that I want to contribute here, in the 
selection of texts and in the adopted critical mode -- but with one significant 
difference. The frame established for description’s revival is so wide as to be almost 
all-encompassing, as indicated in the forbiddingly numerous disciplines and contexts 
cited in the extensive notes, and in the crossings between widely differing contextual 
understandings of the practice. This breadth of framing is understandable to the extent 
that the revival is pitched as a matter not only of periodic methodological change but 
also of the fraught question of the health and continuance of the humanities, and of 
the latter’s presence or otherwise as acknowledged beyond an immediate institutional 
location. Tactically to work from within description’s framings, however, may mean 
the shrinking rather than expansion of reach and remit. Rather than claim description 
as ‘everywhere… ubiquitous and necessary’, I suggest the possibility that it is in 
writing a relatively infrequent thing -- that it comes rarely -- and more gratuitous than 
justifiable; and that therein lies its promise and its potential. Again, description as 
framed in recent accounts appears as an endlessly mobile force, expandable in reach 
to the point of meaning almost anything; or rather, of meaning almost everything. 
Most speech acts can be conceived as description or as descriptive. Hence, in part, the 
addiction and the rhetoric of betterment, enacted one turn at a time as the remit 
expands. The re-description that follows here is intended to counter such 
expansiveness by appropriating and inhabiting the historical identification of 
description as variously secondary, ‘an auxiliary discourse’, an identification that 
appears across the ages and that straddles creative and critical (interpretative) fields.9 
Description thus conceived is a minor thing, perhaps not even a thing at all so much 
as an orientation, akin to what Sedgwick, reading a Proustian ekphrasis, calls ‘the 
structure of a need’;10 or an inclination, to borrow from another recently proposed 
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model of relation.11 To acknowledge our desirous investment in the forms of our 
describing, a desire that need not be expressive of dependency, is to admit the degree 
of fantasy involved. The writing invoked and imagined, whether defined contextually 
as creative or critical, has what we might call a feeling for description: a feeling for 
the feeling that description can have.12 It tends towards generic conventionality in the 
sense of the set-piece, whether as standing alone or framed within its setting. 
Identifying or, again, imagining this rare but significant strain of contemporary 
writing, together with some of its near antecedents, has required a brief ‘nonce 
taxonomy’ -- four elements in total -- that is also performative in its desire to make 
something in the act of naming it as being so -- playfully, selectively, hopefully, if 
perhaps also a little preciously.13 The interest throughout is less in ‘the thing 
described’, albeit relationality is a central concern, than it is in ‘the actual movement 
of the description’.14 
Mere Description 
To begin, there is the matter of description as tending to signify that part of writing 
most likely to be felt as skippable with impunity, because nothing, or nothing much, 
happens there. This is in effect the corollary of the notion that description is 
ubiquitous; for to be everywhere requires, surely, a certain translatability, an absence 
of active character? Absence, or lack, let’s say, is differently understood depending on 
context. Description is conceived most generally as inhibitive of progression in its 
reliance on a variously expansive scenario of stopping in order to survey and convey a 
scene, or of being still in order to conjure a scene for similarly static auditors. This 
despite description’s having been charged, perhaps more in the past than recently, 
with a reliance on the time-bound passage of syntax, so as being poorly equipped to 
relay the simultaneity and all-overness of perception. And to prohibit time is to 
prohibit narrative, hence the belief that descriptive passages in novels or other 
narrative-inclined writing can and should be the first to go when time is of the essence 
and we are reading for the plot. If we are inclined to be generous we might allow that 
description here is supplementary, and as such necessary, to the main matter of what 
happens next. 
Similarly, description is at best preparatory to the activity of interpretation, and at 
worst, rendered redundant by it; by interpretation, that is, conceived as an action and 
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an event, compared to which description is inactively passive: a non-event. And in 
being passive, even if only relative to the ostensible character of another mode of 
writing, description is quietistic, hence the really stinging charge of its being 
constitutionally conservative and essentialising. To interpret is gradually over time to 
explain the matter at hand as being at least partly otherwise to itself, hence the 
proximity of interpretation to translation; whereas to describe is to risk repeating what 
is already evident, even when such evidence is nothing more than the tautological 
naturalisations of ideology and received convention. Again, if we are inclined to be 
generous we might allow that a degree of preparatory repetition of the material in 
question is necessary in order to clear or prepare the ground for the activity of 
interpretation. 
All of which only slightly exaggerated backstory is intended to explain description’s 
trademark adjectival inheritance: mere, as in ‘mere description’ and the ‘merely 
descriptive’. Marcus, Love and Best, editors of ‘Description Across the Disciplines’, 
acknowledge the continued currency of the adjectival charge over a wide range of 
contexts, adding that the ‘explicit discomfort’ expressed in the public accusation of 
‘mere description’ is a means ‘tacit[ly]’ of disavowing the necessary inseparability of 
description and interpretation.15 The insignificance of the mere is not thereby 
countered, however, but rather recuperated as further evidence of necessity, in its 
signifying the minor or secondary: ‘Description makes objects and phenomena 
available for analysis and synthesis’; as such, it is ‘a core, if unacknowledged, method 
in all scholarship and teaching’. A first response to the charge of the mere is thus to 
re-state description’s formative role on the path to interpretation. A second, as 
suggested above, seeks to discount by transvaluation the very notion of description’s 
being merely anything. Either description is mere, in its being benignly preparatory, 
or it isn’t, in its being rather something else instead.  
But what if we were to hold close what Brian Glavey calls ‘the mereness of mere 
description’?16 The phrase already sounds promising. Bruno Latour, in asking ‘What 
is so wrong with “mere descriptions”?’, appears to be thinking along similar lines.17 
And yet while the Latourian register is undoubtedly germane to the current 
revivialism, in seeking to work past a default mode of critique,  it is also another 
transvaluing according to which description is revealed as ‘the highest and rarest 
achievement’.18 Surely it can no longer be mere in being so distinguished? And so we 
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forego the promise of this apparently innocuous inheritance from description’s 
discourse. Mere, after all, is a promising proposition. Its etymological hinterland lies 
with gleam and glitter, thence with the clear and the bright, and, via merus -- unmixed 
-- a figuring of the true and the genuine. It offers thus a co-existence: the mere as 
nothing-less-than and the mere as nothing-more-than. Extrapolating from the gift of 
such an inheritance, we can say of the mereness of mere description that its distinction 
or quality resides in its being absolutely itself in its insignificance: no more than what 
it is, hence prone to easy dismissal as not enough, especially, according to those 
critics of description through the ages, when it is too much.  Seeking to substantiate 
such a claim, we might align description with the interesting as conceived by Sianne 
Ngai, an alliance made possible in part via a shared affiliation to the mere: as Ngai 
says, ‘“Interesting” almost always seems to come with “merely” attached to it, as if to 
highlight its structural indeterminacy, or what Hegel would call its lack of content’.19 
Description, as orientation as much example, is a case of the merely interesting in the 
historically-inflected sense established by Ngai, a judgment ‘based not on an existing 
concept of the object but on a feeling, hard to categorize in its own right, that in spite 
of its indeterminacy aptly discerns or alerts us precisely to what we do not have a 
concept for (yet)’.20 Description’s interestingness certainly carries the sense of 
‘affective as well as conceptual indefiniteness’ in those relatively rare instances where 
the possibility of mereness feels to have been essayed in writing.21 Hence, for 
example, Kathleen Stewart’s attempts to articulate what she calls ‘ordinary affects’ 
through an ethnographic project of avowedly descriptive prose. Ordinary affects are 
here akin to the provocations of an everyday interestingness and to the glittering 
insignificance of things mere. They are those happenings that come fleetingly ‘into 
view’ (the visual metaphor is in keeping with ekphrasis as a bringing to the mind’s 
eye) when through the ‘density and texture’ of the assemblage of the ordinary, 
‘something feels like something’.22 ‘They give circuits and flows the forms of a life’, 
but as such -- in inhabiting a ‘reeling present’ -- are resistant to the objectifying 
structurings of ‘representational thinking and evaluative critique’. Hence a descriptive 
register intended as a ‘contact zone’: ‘to fashion some form of address that is 
adequate… to say something about ordinary affects by performing some of the 
intensity and texture that makes them habitable and animate’. Stewart’s is a serial 
form -- ‘an assemblage of disparate scenes’ -- reminiscent of the quintessentially 
‘merely interesting’ variations of conceptualism. The tendency is towards a kind of 
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anecdote, but the cumulative effect, as she gathers examples of like-minded writing, is 
of what Stewart calls elsewhere ‘strangely realist description’, intermittent evidence 
of an ‘improvisatory conceptuality, a germinal aesthetic’.23 
The nearest equivalent in contemporary fictional prose is Claire-Louise Bennett’s 
Pond. Recent innovative fiction, in its Anglo-American guise, is often either resistant 
to the inherited descriptive tendencies of the prosaic -- in the work, say, of Lydia 
Davis, Ali Smith, Nell Zink and Diane Williams -- or intent conceptually to inhabit 
that tendency so as to turn it from within, in the likes of Ben Marcus and Tom 
McCarthy.24 Bennett’s Pond falls somewhere in-between. It makes no claim to 
contemporaneity; indeed, it refuses the imposition of such an idea, in a series of sly 
hints. ‘I’m not sure what now is about’, so the narrator admits.25 The refusal is played 
out in part in the writing’s merely descriptive register, akin to Stewart’s serial 
articulation of ordinary affects in ‘strangely realist’ textural lightness.26 Bennett’s 
pond has ‘absolutely no depth whatsoever’, which shallowness marks it out from its 
unavoidable precursor -- Thoreau’s pond at Walden -- and from those associations 
suggested and produced variously by depth.27 The surface is where we are in Pond; 
and of course, the surface is where we are with description, hence the age-old charge 
of its being constitutionally, even dangerously, inclined to linger over the incidental. 
Yet even the profundities that might result from descriptive acuity are similarly batted 
away -- ‘Everyone has seen a sunset -- I will not attempt to describe the precise visual 
delineations of this one’, hence a motivic resistance to conventions of writerly 
signifying: ‘Not a metaphor, nothing like that… I don’t want to be in the business of 
turning things into other things’.28 Pond’s life is in the ‘minor consellations’ of its 
‘strangely intimate’ way with matter: in its pens, coloured straws, control knobs, 
shells and compost.29 Hence the delivery of a pair of Japanese tapestries does not 
occasion ekphrastic detailing or framed allegory; indeed, ‘they can hardly be thought 
of as tapestries at all -- they aren’t much more than two pieces of old black cloth in 
two separate frames with some rose-gold flecks here and there’.30 Description frames 
the ‘one small diagonal area of cloth’ that is decorated, but decides as it goes that 
large areas of undecorated cloth are not the result of unpicking but are rather just as 
they appear: ‘Nothing had been undone; there hasn’t ever been more than this […] 
just these few details showed enough’.31 The merely strange realism of Bennett’s 
descriptions, here and elsewhere, registers a world neither present for human perusal -
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- ‘I guess what has always frustrated me is the emphasis on the human. We live in a 
very anthropocentric culture, and the affiliated notion of convenience disgusts me’ -- 
nor other in a respectfully ecological sense.32 It would be convenient to be able to say 
that Bennett writes prose akin in its descriptions to the speculatively realist ekphrastic 
register identified by Timothy Morton, a register of ‘intimacy with an alien presence’ 
of co-objecthood: describer and described.33 Morton’s conception chimes with 
Bennet’s up to a point, but it fails to catch the hovering affective ambience, the 
nothing-less-than-but-nothing-more-than, of  mere description. Pond’s narrator 
remains variously indifferent (to use her own word) to the lure of description as a 
finding and fixing of perspective, and to the comfort that accrues from such certainty. 
She inclines instead towards an ‘arrangement of feeling’ according to sensation and 
impression (two more motif words), an ‘errant poignancy’ that stays with rather than 
overcomes its surface tensions.34 
Description’s Gratuity 
Description’s interest as imagined in a register of the merely, a register the foregoing 
has sought to cherish rather than disavow, lies at one of end of a discursive 
inheritance. Facing it from a position ostensibly of opposition is the forceful framing 
of description as decorative and so auxiliary. The opposition is only ostensible 
because, as already indicated by the idea of the merely, there is a relation between the 
glittering and the insufficient; a relation, that is, between insufficiency, as being not 
enough, and the supplemental or excessive. Each is positioned as teetering on the 
brink of the proper of writing, either weakly prior to it or indulgently additional. The 
response in each case has tended to be a mobilising of essentially suppressive or 
repressive injunctions.35 
‘Description decorates’.36 Lisa Robertson, writing obliquely on the ‘important 
decorative work’ of weather description, evokes here, so to turn, this core motif of the 
general discourse attendant on the mode. As with all such constituent parts there is a 
retraceable logic at work in the identification and fixing of attitudes across a range of 
forms of writing, albeit the respective motifs can each carry a different connotation at 
different historical moments. The motif of description as decoration stems in part 
from the more general notion of rhetoric as comprising essential and ornamental 
elements, with the rhetorical form of ekphrasis, allied more broadly with enargia, 
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being an instance of the latter.37 The tendency of description towards the form of the 
set-piece leads to its characterisation as ‘gem’, if standing alone, or ‘cyst’, if framed 
within a larger context (to borrow colourful characterisations from two recent 
accounts).38 Description thrives on amplification; and so whether gem or cyst, there is 
the potential frustration, by disruption or halting, of progression; the frustration, that 
is, of the time within which narrative or argument unfold. More specifically, it is not 
amplification per se that brings description into disrepute, rather the nature of the 
expansion. As evident prominently in the statements supporting a revival of the mode 
at the present time, the surface is where description resides. To describe is rhetorically 
to display a scene, so to make it vividly present for the auditor. Hence description is 
prone to being framed as an ornament twice over: in relation to the substantial text on 
or in which it sits and in its own visualising operation. Description details – 
ornaments; embellishes; decorates -- because detailing is its object; and of course, 
decoration, in connoting a form of superficiality (hence the ‘certain essential 
superficiality of description’), can be deemed both worryingly meaningless -- the 
purely decorative parallels the merely descriptive in this regard -- and prone 
constitutionally to excess, even to supplanting the host body.39 The gendered and 
sexualised resonances are all too apparent: to borrow from Grant Scott’s history of the 
discursive fixing of ekphrasis, ‘The mistrust of finery and ornament at least in part… 
stems from a fear of its origins in the feminine unconscious. To embellish is to do 
women’s work; to declare plainly and straightforwardly to further the “manly” 
cause’.40 Hence the aforementioned regulatory impulse: ‘At root, the definitions 
conceal a desire to repress fancy, ornateness, and rhetorical flourish’.41 
Now, this is not to suggest that the mainline of this element of the discourse has not 
been reversed -- by Robbe-Grillet and the nouveau-romanciers, most pointedly, 
whose avowedly anti-humanist ‘interest’ in the mode ‘no longer lies in the thing 
described, but in the actual movement of the description’, thereby making of 
decoration a defence against all manner of anthropomorphism and the like.42 I am 
seeking to trace here, not a reversal, rather something finer and perhaps less easy to 
articulate; something like an occupancy of the discursive inheritance, a working both 
with it and from within. Lisa Robertson hints at such an occupancy in The Weather, 
from whose short prose introduction, presented as an insert in the volume, I have been 
quoting.43 The specific field is ‘the rhetorical structure of English meteorological 
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description’, a field inhabited by Robertson after the manner of a ‘spy’.44 Weather 
description in its more scientistic register has been regulated by a variously de-
ornamenting imperative, one consequence of which has been a disavowal of the 
affective life, potentially, of a common currency of weather talk. Robertson inhabits 
and shifts the language from within -- ‘Like a little weather demonstrating formal 
inexhaustibility, the empirical description is the site of its own transgression’ -- and so 
inherits by embracing the gendering of what is claimed and celebrated now as 
‘important decorative work’: ‘my sex is a problem within sincerity […] I want a 
viable climate. I'll make it in description’;45 for ‘description itself must offer 
shelter’.46 Hence a glittering written work of ‘Becoming ornament’ -- ‘We would, 
with ultra-enriched and devoted femininity, decorate for them’ -- and an employment 
of ‘description’ itself, this merely common word, as ornament dispersed within the 
ekphrastic environment of the poem: ‘Everything I’m writing about / begins as the 
robin as the song / sparrow begins is description / animals are description sparkling’.47 
As Michel Beaujour notes, it is in its set-piece ekphrastic mode, hence as it acquires a 
degree of what we would identify now as ‘aesthetic autonomy’, that description came 
to lay itself open to charges of being ‘gratuitous’: ‘tainted with the dubious reputation 
of sophistry: a profitable but somewhat undignified display of skill, an ungentlemanly 
indifference to usefulness, truth, justice, wisdom and the common good’.48 Robertson 
inherits as part of her work’s ambience description’s regulation as intended to 
preclude a drift towards gratuitous ornament; and as with the idea of the merely, it is 
in the term of the regulation itself -- its gratuitous inclinations -- that we can gather 
description’s possibilities. The very idea of the gratuitous description registers the 
seductions it seeks to manage: uncalled for and unearned; and in being unearned, 
linked, however supplementarily, to currency and exchange. But then also, in being a 
gift, somehow outside of exchange precisely in so far as believed to be prone to 
immoderation. 
Where Robertson works the decorative surface of description, it is in the ‘ekphrastic 
embroideries’ of another arch-describer, Wayne Koestenbaum, that the laws against 
gratuitousness are flouted, and with them a whole repressive apparatus attendant on 
the mode.49 Koestenbaum gestures towards elements of this apparatus in saying of his 
art writing that it ‘has no wish to occupy a superior vantage, looking down on art; nor 
does [it]… desire to occupy a position of inferior vantage, looking up to art. Nor does 
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[it]… propose a relation of equal footing, a mutual, interactive gaze’.50 The writing in 
question has instead been ‘swallowed’ by its object: it is ‘inside art’. Koestenbaum is 
clearly no ‘closet ekphrastic’, willing to accept only the hedging of a ‘seepage of 
rhetoric from the visual to the verbal’.51 Hence ‘The Desire to Write’, an essay 
comprising a series of set-piece fantasy descriptions of paintings by Picasso, Matisse 
and Picabia. The generic framings of ekphrasis are adopted, but rather than seek to 
control the inclinations of the register, however sophisticatedly (‘inclinations’ is a 
word he uses), the writing luxuriates in them: ‘I write to multiply occasions for 
stimulation and to magnify my power to experience pleasure’.52 Koestenbaum has 
admitted elsewhere to loving ‘the “k’ in ekphrasis, like the “k” in Elektra’.53 And why 
not, given it is the letter conjoining writer and mode? The link is gratuitous, I should 
think, and therein resides the clue. The ‘k’ is the kick or the sting, to feel the risk of 
which, perhaps even the threat (for the author as much as for the image or the reader), 
the writing needs to register the restraint being flouted, the restraining of a 
constitutional tendency to drift, between details and without end.54 The tendency is 
acknowledged in these openly desirous pieces as they admit wanting various relations 
with their images: not only ‘to dwell’ with them and their figures or to imitate, but ‘to 
be’ them, even ‘to traverse and to destroy’. The prose essays the standard ekphrastic 
registers -- a narrative account of the provoking scene; a formalist description of its 
shapes and colours; a materialist marking of its substances -- but admits alongside 
such generic staples the wilder identificatory fantasies of dreaming and, repeatedly, of 
stages of arousal. There is a gratuitous breaching of boundaries in the drift between 
registers and relations some of which are incommensurable, especially as that drifting 
happens in writing voyeuristically aware of its own excitements. Koestenbaum’s word 
for this drift is ‘looseness’, prompted by the application of oil paint to pencil sketch in 
a Matisse: ‘a looseness of morals… or a looseness of writerly technique’.55 As he 
admits, ‘I often feel like the victim of my own elation’.56 To borrow from another 
such ekphrastic indulgence, it is prose which seriously ‘overflow(s) the seams’.57 In 
so being, and in its flaunting of a gratuitousness akin to the subversive uselessness, 
the ‘undue pleasure’, of the aesthetic, the writing comes close to outing description as 
being, in the words of Beaujour, ‘functionally perverse’.58 
Description’s Correspondences 
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Walter Pater is an obvious antecedent to Koestenbaum, Ruskin too, but the presiding 
spirit is Roland Barthes, the late Barthes of the ekphrastic Camera Lucida and in 
particular of ‘Rasch’, an extraordinary descriptive response to Robert Schumann’s 
Kreisleriana. The music is conceived by Barthes as having its own body accented in 
sounding, as it ‘curls up’, ‘stretches out’, ‘wakens’, ‘declares’, ‘throbs’ and 
‘irritates’.59 Koestenbaum’s desiring conceit, its verbs in particular, has its origins 
here in Barthes’s interruptive (non-developmental) and desirously affected fragments. 
The verb is for Barthes a liberation from the adjective, that staple of description that 
makes of the register not a sign of vitality, as suggested by the classical conception of 
ekphrasis, but, in its ‘feigning’ illusion of animation, quite the opposite: ‘The 
adjective is the instrument of this illusion; whatever it says, by its descriptive quality 
alone, the adjective is funereal’.60 The way out of this deathly relation -- we feel the 
deathliness as it reverses the ekphrastic encounter conceived as animating -- does not 
come by renewed efforts towards ‘some substantive or verbal periphrasis’, but rather 
by a change in our conception of the (in this case) musical object, thereby ‘to shift the 
fringe of contact between language and music’. Hence Kreisleriana heard as ‘this 
body that beats’, that pulses, with a repertoire only some of the movements of which 
are nameable. And in perhaps the most flagrant flouting of descriptive protocol, 
Barthes admits the possibility that ‘[He] alone [can] hear them’, the sounds of this 
beating body; admits, that is, the possibility of ‘hallucinated evidence’.61 Description 
is being led astray. 
Barthes’s shifting of the fringe of contact between language and its object is his way 
of evading description’s ‘predicative fatality’.62 The effect is a turning of the 
relationality of description: the inherited scenario, both spatial and temporal, of 
describer and described, a scenario framed repeatedly in the discourse of description 
as being, inter alia, deferential, overbearing, co-optive, anxious, frustrated or 
estranged. Varieties of the same conceptual turning appear intermittently in Barthes’s 
late works, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes in particular, with its serial play on the 
possibility of non-mimetic or analogical forms of being-with. These include the 
‘contrary excesses’ of the copy, understood as ‘feigning a spectacularly flat respect’ 
for its object, and the systematic distortion; and comparison, at once ‘literal and 
vague’, as a form of ‘deporting’ of the object.63 The serial inventions of Barthes’s late 
prose, in which individual items encroach on and leak into their nearest neighbour, is 
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pluralising; and yet at the risk of disavowing the performative mobility of the writing, 
we can identify a series of figures of the relation that have as at least one of their 
motivations a desire to re-describe description: to shift its fringe of contact. 
The reimagining of description’s relationality, with all that might imply, is one 
prominently Barthesian inheritance evident in Eve Sedgwick and, in particular, Leo 
Bersani. There is a moment in the work of each when they alight on an ekphrastic 
passage from Proust, and in accounting for it, elaborate the promise of description 
suggested by Barthes. In Bersani’s case, on which I shall concentrate, there is the 
additional resonance of the passage from Proust appearing in the course of a book that 
is itself a singular instance, in form and register, of description’s contemporary 
promise, and which offers a near antecedent to the contemporary writing gathered 
here. Arthur Danto is one of very few critics to have recognised the text in question, 
Caravaggio’s Secrets, written by Bersani with Ulysse Dutoit, in these terms: as a 
‘collaborative ekphrasis’, one that ‘addresses us as members of an ekphrastic 
community’, but that does not ‘construe ekphrasis as if it were merely the equivalent 
of an image’ (we can let pass for now Danto’s ‘merely’).64 The collaborative 
composition as itself a form of relational practice is significant in being of a piece 
with the ethics of ekphrasis elaborated in the writing. The Proust moment occurs as 
Bersani and Dutoit attempt to move beyond the dualism inherent in the conventional 
accounts of Caravaggio’s presentation of himself in his own canvases. Marcel is 
describing buttercups found on the Guermantes Way, in all their yolky yellownesss. 
An encounter of this kind tends in Proust to follow a characteristic descriptive arc 
whereby the otherness found in the world, in being identified as such, provokes an 
‘appetitive relation’: an anxious desire to understand ‘the object’s hidden, precious 
depths’, and in so doing, to appropriate and incorporate difference.65 The satisfaction 
of physical devouring -- the imagined ingestion of the buttercups-as-eggs -- enacts by 
sublimation a relationship of knower and known, the latter having preserved by 
expansion an integrity only temporarily threatened, albeit pleasurably. On this 
occasion, however, the chain loops back to the buttercups, in themselves and as 
viewed. Marcel takes pleasure in the sight but it is a ‘generous’ pleasure experienced 
as a form of ‘connectedness’ or ‘nonsadistic relation’, a being both implicated in the 
world and apart from it: ‘Through his pleasure he “corresponds” with and to that 
which is at once different and identical to himself -- a segment of the world’s 
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appearance’.66 Hence what is later described by Bersani and Dutoit as ‘an active 
insertion into the movement of being’: ‘We are not cut off from anything: nothing 
escapes connectedness, the play of and between forms’.67 ‘Nothing escapes 
connectedness’ might stand as a motto for the current vogue for description, in the 
latter’s seeking to testify to the mode as ‘connect[ing] us to others -- to those 
described, to the makers of what we describe, to other describers’.68 
Bersani and Dutoit’s ‘collaborative ekphrasis’, written in a style that invites in its turn 
a kind of puzzled participation on the part of the reader, is an exemplary forerunner of 
contemporary ekphrastic practice. And yet its exemplarity is such to preclude 
extrapolation as paradigm. It stands rather as the third item in the present series of 
four, a series that is, again, discontinuous and devoted in each of its instances to 
description conceived in such a way as to admit its happening, not everywhere and 
always, but infrequently; a relatively rare thing, in writing, whether as a form of 
paradoxically constituted mere-ness, as gratuitous ornament or, now, as a particular 
form of correspondence, a form elaborated by Bersani and Dutoit. 
The Caravaggio book can be set alongside that other signal work of contemporary 
ekphrasis, T.J. Clark’s The Sight of Death, a quasi-meditative experiment with the 
repeated viewing of single images over time and with a register of processual writing 
in which such viewing is held, as a chord is sustained in tonal music, rather than 
resolved after the fact in the achievement of interpretation.69 The two are markedly 
different, but each in its own way, and with varying degrees of explicitness, is 
concerned specifically to establish a form of relation or relations with its objects, a 
form the establishment and sustaining of which happens in and through the 
descriptive register. As complementary instances of a relatively late turn to 
description, Clark’s recent work is the more sustained of the two; but it is Bersani 
who speculates broadly on ‘new modes of relating and relationality’, some of which 
are not in fact new, but rather, ‘ways that exist anyway, but which we are trained, 
culturally, not to notice’.70 Description as I am imagining it here is one such inherited 
but newly resonant form of relationality in writing, a form of the ‘non-identical 
sameness’ that preoccupies late Bersani and which he identifies variously as 
‘homoness, inaccurate replication… similitude… alikeness’.71 As we saw with the 
reading of Proust’s buttercups, ‘relational being’ thus imagined is non-dualistic, non-
appropriative, non-identificatory and non-interpretative. Interpretation is replaced by 
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what Bersani calls ‘correspondences of forms’: ‘the continuation of all things 
elsewhere’, a continuation that ‘in contributing new inscriptions’ is also ‘an 
accretion’.72 Correspondences thus conceived are the aforementioned ‘inaccurate 
replications’ in which the universe consists, through ‘perpetual and imperfect 
recurrences of forms’ that guarantee a ‘kind of looping movement’ between object 
and subject, each finding itself and being found in the other.73 As this suggests, 
Bersani is articulating nothing less than ‘an ontological regime of correspondences in 
which the discreteness of all things… is superseded, not by universal fusions but 
[again] by the continuation of all things elsewhere’. The shattering of the self is 
replaced by ‘self-dispersal’: ‘the pleasure of finding ourselves harboured within [the 
world]’.74 
Descriptive correspondence as an instance of inaccurate replication: this is what I take 
from Bersani and what is worked out in detail in his collaborative readings with 
Dutoit (and elsewhere). Perhaps ‘inaccurate replication’, in the loopingly reciprocal 
sense proposed, is a term suitable for the discontinuous series of descriptive registers 
noted here. Description’s constitutionally relational operation would shift away from 
one of the many modes assigned to it through the ages -- commemorative; 
enumerative; contemplative; melancholic; elegiac; deferential; passive-aggressive; 
paranoid; alienating -- and settle instead on a kind of ‘mysticism’ or ‘mystical 
orientation’.75 Such a mode will likely be a rare achievement, but all the more 
valuable forbeing occasional. 
Description’s Praises  
Malcolm Bowie recognises in Bersani’s recent work the practice of ‘criticism as an 
ecstatic and epiphanic art’, one of ‘intensities’ by force of which a visual or verbal 
element is ‘affirmed’.76 Description is not the only register essayed in the writing, but 
it is the one with the richest resonance, in terms of discursive inheritance, and the 
most potential, in terms of a frustrating or disavowing of ostensible distinctions 
between what would now be recognised as critical and creative orientations. 
Affirmation, marked by Bowie in Bersani, is one of the means and of the symptoms 
of this disavowal, linked as it is the classical conception of ekphrasis; in particular, to 
ekphrasis understood as a type of discourse evident in two of the three branches of 
rhetoric: the judicial or forensic, and that ceremonial display of praise or blame 
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known as epideictic. While the two branches are equally purposive and prompting of 
judgement, it is the latter that tends to be identified as the origin of description 
practised as a semi-detached or detachable rhetorical exercise. And it is the appraising 
relation of description as praise -- as linked to ‘thanks and acts of grace… a sort of 
gift-in-return’ -- that draws it within the range of those reparative critical modes 
suggested by Eve Sedgwick.77 
Of those registers of description loosely gathered in series here the praiseful is 
perhaps the rarest. Descriptive work of the attentively celebrative variety has never 
been more common than it is now, especially in essayistic nature writing the ironic 
flowering of which has been the most prominent literary symptom of ecological crisis. 
And yet much of this writing, however dutifully well-informed, lacks an inclination 
towards description; lacks, that is, a descriptive orientation -- a being within and 
without its inherited convention -- such as I have sought to identify in various forms 
across a disparate and discontinuous range of texts. This orientation in its praiseful 
register is nowhere better displayed than in the Journals of the English poet R.F. 
Langley, a series of set-piece daybook entries describing flora and fauna, buildings 
and art works. Langley acknowledges the Victorian origins of this kind of diaristic 
descriptive prose, and its more recent antecedents in the ‘ambiance of avowal’ of 
eidetic description in phenomenology and forms of psychoanalytically inflected 
contemplation.78 The inheritance is palpable in writing that makes no claim to 
innovation or intervention in establishing a ‘generous sameness’ between itself and its 
provoking occasions, and, in its gratuitous pleasurableness, between itself and the 
reader.79 
At the heart of the volume are five extended entries describing time spent in the 
medieval church at Westhall in Suffolk.80 It is in three of these five entries that 
Langley sounds a singularly affirming note of praise, what in the present context we 
might identify as mere praise.81 The note is struck in the entry dated August 1992: ‘So 
long since I wrote. A year. Who cares? What then? Little’.82 A daybook is mere 
description. Convention suggests that it is also a notating of the scale of things, the 
composition of prose as an establishment of scale. The little that it matters, in the 
grand scheme of things, does not, however, remain ‘still’. It is taken up further in this 
long paragraph of ekphrasis with reference to the ‘Heartstopping littleness of the huge 
space. The unreasonable strength of everything which is nothing more’.83 The merely 
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is the nothing-more-than, and yet littleness is serving here to predicate the sheer and 
paradoxical size of the inside -- of the provoking space as well as of the writing it has 
provoked, the blocked space of the prose as it passes from outside to in, then out 
again into the fields, then back via a butterfly passing into a side aisle. All is at once 
elsewhere and ‘here, still’. The confirming and organising ‘I’ of the describer of the 
scene is barely mentioned, replaced by a self-othering ‘you’ (the standing outside 
oneself of the ecstatic); and while the space of the composition is filled by sensory 
registerings of sound, smell, and above all, light as it passes into the inside space, the 
markings of such do not confirm the coincident presence of the describer -- pace a 
classically phenomenological or aesthetic orientation -- nor the matter of description 
as a making present. Rather, description, like the space it attends, appears to have 
passed ‘beyond all normal uses, messages, instructions’, hence this singularly ecstatic 
register as a form of ‘paying tribute’.84 
Touch appears first to act in its conventional role as the sense most confirming of 
haecceity: of ‘uncommented Westhall’ as ‘just matter’. Description notates the matter 
of the world in its remaining merely itself regardless of commentary: ‘Uncaught… 
unspeakable… uncommented… unmoved’.85 As such, ‘when you touch, you have not 
touched, because their thingness is so dense, so alien’.86 And yet deference to what is 
‘just matter’, one of description’s default modes, is not accompanied here by a self-
chastising melancholy of distance or belatedness, describer to described, a 
melancholy which is only another means of establishing perspective and so of 
confirming one’s own place. The relation now is different, closer to the ‘self-
dispersal’ imagined by Bersani. The dryness that signals age -- the bat droppings; the 
powder; the dry stone -- lays claim to ‘your hand and feet as stuff’, while ‘the 
fragment of freestone you take with you in the glove compartment’ intermingles old 
and still with new and mobile such that each ‘stops’ where it is in the other.87 The 
dent of grass-head on finger ‘takes the fingertips away from you, in the place 
beyond’; takes all of you as you are now, ‘at risk, half gone’. And in the most 
extraordinary instance of ‘non-identical sameness’, the very church itself appears 
actively to describe the light to which it yields: ‘Astoundingly full, undiminished, 
attending to the changes of light through every day, never losing connection with the 
whole world under the sky, but never less than complete, as it is now, and now’.88 
Thus the building itself, both replete and open, is described as describing. 
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Langley channels each of the three descriptive orientations: the merely that is 
occupied rather than overcome or sublimated; the desirously gratuitous and 
ornamental; and an accretive non-identical sameness. The vividly praising note 
proposed here as the fourth orientation -- ‘What it is, this evening, is this: glorious. 
Glories’ -- sounds another form of relationality, an affirming testimony ecstatic in the 
scale-bending sense of turning outside in and in, out, so as to make an open field of 
‘co-perception’ in which description’s relations, its alikenesses, are almost 
hallucinatory, ‘split and stretched and quivered, quivering’.89  
The highs of the Langleyan register are of an order different to those invoked by Jonty 
Tiplady. The hit of confirmation -- of world, self or achieved statement -- is not in 
their gift, nor do they seek an understanding better than the one that came before. Like 
those other registers of contemporary writing the inclinations and antecedents of 
which I have sought to mark, they inhabit rather than seek either to disavow or step 
outside their discursive inheritance. They are an orientation in writing, blurring of the 
boundaries between, on the one hand, the critical or explanatory, where words are 
avowedly about that towards which they point, and on the other, the ostensible 
freestandingness of the art work. Similarly, they occupy a commons of contemporary 
writing in which inherited distinctions of mode or form no longer pertain; for 
description, as now viewed, has always been constitutionally hybrid, the creative 
strain in the critical (hence the discursive anxieties) and vice versa (hence the lowly 
reputation). Such writing offers glimpses of description as being what Lyn Hejinian 
calls a ‘particular and complicated process of thinking’: ‘phenomenal rather than 
epiphenomenal’, ‘a method of invention and composition’ requiring not a theory but a 
poetics.90 It ‘should not be confused with definition; it is not definitive but 
transformative’.91 The writing thus essayed, some of the possibilities of which have 
been gathered here, displays the orientations of our ‘new ornaments’. 
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